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The interpretation-construction distinction is back. Contract scholars 
have long recognized the difference between deciding what words mean, 
or “interpretation,” and determining their legal effect, “construction.” But in 
the last decade constitutional scholars have begun to attend to the 
difference as well. “New Originalists” like Randy Barnett, Jack Balkin, and 
Larry Solum have deployed the distinction to divide constitutional questions 
into two broad categories.2 The first comprises questions that originalist 
interpretation can answer. These include easy questions, like how old a 
person must be to serve as President—“the Age of thirty five Years”3—and 
perhaps also harder ones, such as the scope of “the right of the People to 
keep and bear arms.”4 In the second category are questions that the text’s 
original meaning does not answer, such as the reach of vague constitutional 
terms such as “freedom of speech” or “due process of law.”5 The latter 
category of questions occupy a “construction zone,” a region where 
interpretive rules and original meaning must be supplemented with other 
legal rules or principles to determine what the Constitution requires.6 
To those of us who find the distinction between interpretation and 
construction helpful, the new attention from constitutional theorists is 
exciting. Contract scholars who have discussed the difference between 
interpretation and construction never claimed it applied only to the law of 
contracts. In fact, the concepts first appeared in Francis Lieber’s more 
                                                
1 Agnes N. Williams Research Professor, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center. I am grateful from the questions and feedback I 
received from Jud Campbell, John Mikhail and Larry Solum, and other 
participants at the 2018 Salmon P. Chase Faculty Colloquium & Lecture, 
Center for the Constitution, at Georgetown University Law Center. 
2 See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 
27 Const. Comment. 95 (2010); Randy Barnett, Interpretation and 
Construction, 34 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 65 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, The 
New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 Fordham L. Rev. 641 (2013). 
3 U.S. Const. art. II sect. 1. 
4 U.S. Const. amend. II. 
5 U.S. Const. amend. I & V. 
6 See, e.g., Solum, supra note 2 at 108. 
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general 1839 work, Legal and Political Hermeneutics—which barely 
touches on contract law.7 So it is good to see the ideas being taken up by 
scholars elsewhere. 
At the same time, the new champions of the distinction have taken 
it in directions a contracts scholar might find surprising. The idea of a 
construction zone is not native to contract law, and it is not clear that it 
makes sense there. And though textualism about contracts has had many 
champions, few would claim that parties’ contractual obligations can ever 
be determined only by interpreting their words—that there is something like 
an interpretation zone. No matter how clear and unambiguous the parties’ 
language, a court will not enforce an agreement that is unconscionable, 
against public policy, the result of fraud, mistake or duress, or in which a 
party lacked capacity. When the New Originalists divide constitutional 
questions between a zone of interpretation and a zone of construction they 
are doing something new and different with the distinction. 
This Article examines the interpretation-construction distinction 
from the perspective of contract law. I make four claims about the activities 
of interpretation and construction and the relationship between them. First, 
construction happens not only when interpretation runs out, but is always 
necessary to determine a text or other meaningful act’s legal effect. 
Construction does not supplement interpretation, but complements it. 
Second, there are multiple forms of interpretation and multiple types of 
meaning. What meaning a text or other speech act has depends on what 
questions one asks about it. Third, which type of meaning is legally relevant 
depends on the applicable rule of construction. Rules of construction are in 
the law conceptually prior to rules of interpretation. Finally, because a 
single text can have multiple types of meaning, when interpretation of one 
type runs out, interpretation of another might step in. Whether that is so 
again depends on the applicable rule of construction. 
Although I make the case for these four claims with reference to the 
law of contract, I believe that they apply to legal exegesis generally. In this 
Article, I use the occasion of the Georgetown Center for the Constitution’s 
2018 Salmon P. Chase Faculty Colloquium, which commemorated the 
150th anniversary of the publication of Thomas Cooley’s Treatise on 
Constitutional Limitations, to argue that the above claims about 
interpretation and construction illuminate Cooley’s, and before him Joseph 
Story’s, theories of constitutional interpretation. Neither Cooley nor Story 
relies on the distinction between interpretation and construction. But each 
recognizes the existence of multiple types of meaning a constitutional text 
might have, each appeals to political principles to argue that the public 
meaning of the text at the time of ratification should control, and each 
                                                
7 Francis Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics, or Principles of 
Interpretation and Construction in Law and Politics (enlarged ed. 
1839/1970) (hereinafter “Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics”). 
 
 
 
Contracts and Constitutions  
 
 3 
recognizes that once one form of interpretation runs out, another might step 
in. Their theories therefore reflect both the difference between the activities 
of interpretation and construction, and a correct understanding of the 
relationship between them. 
Part One provides basic definitions “interpretation” and 
“construction,” the two activities that together comprise legal exegesis. Part 
Two uses the example of contract law to analyze the activities of 
interpretation and construction and the relationship between them. Part 
Three argues that the account of interpretation and construction developed 
in Part Two illuminates Joseph Story’s and Thomas Cooley’s constitutional 
theories. Without attempting to provide an exhaustive account of Story’s 
and Cooley’s approaches to constitutional exegesis, I argue that key moves 
in their shared analyses exemplify the relationship between interpretation 
and construction described in Part Two. Part Four briefly discusses the 
appearance of an analog to Lawrence Solum’s fixation thesis in Cooley’s 
treatise, and differences between the Solum’s and Cooley’s arguments for 
that claim. 
1 Basic Concepts 
As I will use the terms, the activity of interpretation identifies the 
meaning of a legal actor’s words or actions; the activity of construction their 
legal effect. Rules of interpretation tell us how to discern the meaning of 
what legal actors say and do; rules of construction tell us how determine 
the resulting legal state of affairs. 
Rules of interpretation and rules of construction are different in 
kind. Interpretation—attributing meaning to words and actions—is 
something we do both inside and outside the law, and legal interpretation 
draws on meanings that originate outside it. The law does not speak its own 
language. Although there exist legal terms of art—“mens rea,” “strict 
scrutiny,” “unconscionability”—legal speakers mostly use words in their 
everyday meanings—“vehicles,” “in,” “park.” When interpreting legal texts, 
Webster’s is generally at least as useful as is Black’s. This is not to say that 
the activity of legal interpretation is identical to interpretation of other 
types. In addition to attending to legal terms of art, legal interpretation is 
often governed by special rules, such as restrictions on the evidence the 
interpreter may consider. But the activity of legal interpretation—assigning 
meaning to legal actors’ words and actions—is continuous with our 
everyday interpretive practices. The rules that give meaning to what legal 
actors say and do originate by and large outside the law. 
Construction, in distinction, is a purely legal activity. Rules of 
construction are components of what H.L.A. Hart calls “secondary rules,” 
rules that “provide that human beings may by doing or saying certain things 
introduce new [legal rules], extinguish or modify old ones, or in various 
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ways determine their incidence or control.”8 If a public official’s or private 
person’s words effect a change in the legal landscape, it is not solely 
because of what those words mean. It is also because there is a legal rule 
that gives that person the power to effect the legal change in that way.9 
Such rules include sub-rules of the form: When person P does or says x, the 
legal result is y. Those rules are, in the sense I use the term, rules of 
construction; they determine the legal effect of authorized speech acts. 
Whereas rules of interpretation originate outside the law, rules of 
construction are creatures of law. Rules of construction govern when and 
how a person’s words or actions effect a legal change. 
In this Article, I follow Lieber and use “exegesis” to refer to the 
practice of interpretation and construction together.10 Legal exegesis is the 
process of determining the legal effect of a legal actor’s words or actions. 
Often, though not always, legal exegesis involves both interpretation and 
construction.11 A theoretical account of legal exegesis therefore requires an 
account of both legal activities and the relationship between them. 
This Article does not provide a complete theory of legal exegesis. 
My goal is to identify a few salient and often overlooked aspects of the 
relationship between its two components, interpretation and construction, 
using as illustrations first contract law and then two nineteenth century 
accounts of constitutional interpretation. 
2 Interpretation and Construction in Contract Law 
It is easy to see the difference between interpretation and 
construction in the law of contracts. Because contractual obligations are 
chosen obligations, they depend in large part on the parties’ intent. 
Identifying the parties’ intent requires interpreting their words and actions. 
Thus one commonly finds in contract decisions, at the beginning of the 
court’s legal analysis, an affirmation that “[t]he primary goal in interpreting 
contracts is to determine and enforce the parties’ intent.”12 Because 
                                                
8 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 81 (2d ed. 1994).   
9 Hart calls this category of secondary rules “rules of change.” Id. at 95-96. 
10 Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 64. 
11 Not always because the construction of a legal formality, such as the 
private seal, does not require interpretation of its meaning. The use of the 
formality suffices to effect the legal change. That said, many legal 
formalities also include defenses, such as mistake, that call for 
interpretation of the parties’ beliefs and intentions. The legal effect of such 
formalities is to create a presumptive legal change, which might be 
defeated by interpretation of what the particular use of the formality meant 
in context. 
12 Old Kent Bank v. Sobczak, 243 Mich. App. 57, 63 (2000). A few other 
examples: “The fundamental, neutral precept of contract interpretation is 
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contractual obligations are chosen obligations, their identification requires 
interpretation of parties’ acts of choice. 
But contractual obligations are not only a matter of party choice, 
and even when party choice controls there are rules governing how courts 
identify it. Examples are manifold. Sometimes when parties enter into a 
binding agreement, they do not have or do not express an intent one way or 
another on a matter—say whether the seller warrants the quality of the 
goods or what the remedy for breach will be. Thus the importance of 
default terms—rules that determine parties’ contractual obligation in the 
absence of evidence or expression of their contrary intent. Or the parties’ 
expressions of intent might be ambiguous. When this occurs, a court might 
apply a rule like contra proferentem, interpreting against the drafter, or the 
preference for interpretations in the public interest, neither of which 
requires further interpretation of the parties’ words or actions. There are 
also cases in which the parties’ intent is clear, but a court will decline to 
give it legal effect. This is so, for example, when the parties’ agreement runs 
contrary to a mandatory rule, such as a minimum wage or civil rights law, 
the penalty rule for liquidated damages, or the generic prohibition on 
enforcing agreements against public policy. Courts also apply interpretive 
rules that predictably sometimes fail to capture the parties’ intent. Plain 
meaning rules, for example, exclude context evidence that can be essential 
for understanding how the parties reasonably understood their own words. 
Thus a recent defense of plain meaning interpretation begins with the thesis 
that sophisticated repeat players care less about interpretive accuracy than 
they do about predictability and reduced costs of interpretation.13 Finally, 
the words “the parties’ intent” are themselves ambiguous. Do they refer, for 
example, to parties’ intent with respect to their legal obligations? Or do they 
refer only to their intended exchange, from which those legal obligations 
flow? Is it their actual, subjective intent? Or is it their objective intent—what 
a reasonable person in their situation would understand their intent to be? 
All this suggests that courts do much more than merely interpret contracting 
parties’ words and actions. They apply rules of construction to determine 
those words and actions’ legal effects. 
                                                                                                                     
that agreements are construed in accord with the parties’ intent.” Greenfield 
v. Philles Records, Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 562, 569 (2002). “Under statutory rules 
of contract interpretation, the mutual intention of the parties at the time the 
contract is formed governs interpretation.” AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 
51 Cal. 3d 807, 821 (1990) (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 1636). “The cardinal 
rule for interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the intention of the parties 
and to give effect to that intention, consistent with legal principles.” Bob 
Pearsall Motors, Inc. v. Regal Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 521 S.W.2d 578, 
580 (Tenn. 1975). 
13 Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 Yale L.J. 541 (2003). 
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This Article’s working hypothesis is that exploring the interplay 
between interpretation and construction in contract law illuminates how 
those activities function elsewhere in the law. This Part identifies four 
structural features of legal exegesis, each of which is readily apparent in the 
law of contract. My claim—which I do not fully defend, but begin to 
explore in the Part Three—is that these features are general ones. Although 
rules of legal exegesis differ across various domains of law, these four 
features hold constant. Part Three argues that attending to them casts new 
light on Joseph Story and Thomas Cooley’s theories of constitutional 
exegesis. 
2.1 Construction does not supplement interpretation, but complements it 
Francis Lieber, who introduced the interpretation-construction 
distinction in his 1839 book Legal and Political Hermeneutics, employs 
what I will call a “supplemental” conception of the activities of 
interpretation and construction. On Lieber’s conception, interpretation 
alone sometimes suffices to determine a text’s legal effect; construction is 
necessary only when interpretation either runs out or runs up against a 
higher-order rule. “[W]e have to settle whether in the given case, 
interpretation suffices, or whether we must have recourse to construction.”14 
In the course of Legal and Political Hermeneutics, Lieber identifies three 
circumstances in which interpretation might not fully determine a text’s 
legal effect—situations in which “interpretation ceases to avail.”15 The first 
is when the text’s meaning is unclear, for example because it contains 
internal contradictions.16 The second is when the lawgiver did not foresee 
certain cases, and therefore failed to provide for them.17 The third occurs 
                                                
14 Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 62. 
15 Id. at 55. 
16 Id. at 55-56. Today theorists would more likely emphasize ambiguities. 
Lieber, for reasons internal to his theory of meaning, holds that legal texts 
are never truly ambiguous. Id. at 86. 
17 Id. at 56 (“Construction is likewise our guide, if we are bound to act in 
cases which have not been foreseen by framers of those rules, by which we 
are nevertheless obliged, for some binding reason, faithfully to regulate, as 
well as we can, our actions respecting the unforeseen case.”), 57 (“In 
politics, construction signifies generally the supplying of supposed or real 
imperfections, or insufficiencies of a text, according to proper principles 
and rules. By insufficiency, we understand, both imperfect provision for the 
cases, which might or ought to have been provided for, and the 
inadequateness of the text for cases which human wisdom could not 
foresee.”), 121 (“Construction is unavoidable. Men who use words, even 
with the best intent and great care as well as skill, cannot foresee all 
possible complex cases, and if they could, they would be unable to provide 
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when the text’s meaning contravenes “more general and binding rules, 
[such as] constitutional, written and solemnly acknowledged rules, or moral 
ones, written in the heart of every man.”18 In each of these situations, 
interpretation alone does not tell us what the law is. It must be 
supplemented by the activity of construction. In all other circumstances, 
interpretation suffices. The text’s legal effect corresponds to its meaning, 
and the text’s interpretation tells us what the law is. 
Lieber’s supplemental conception might be traced to his focus on 
public law—statutes and constitutions, as distinguished from contracts, 
deeds and other private legal documents—together with an implicit 
adherence to the command theory of law.19 The point of a command 
relationship is to give the commander the power to choose, within the 
scope of her command authority, what the recipient shall be required to do. 
When interpreting the commander’s words, the recipient’s job is therefore 
to discern the commander’s choice, to seek out the intent behind those 
words. “When I say, ‘Jump,’ you say ‘How high?’”20 This is precisely how 
Lieber understands the activity of interpretation. “Interpretation is the art of 
finding out the . . . sense which their author intended to convey, and of 
enabling others to derive from them the very same idea which the author 
intended to convey.”21 When the sovereign’s words clearly express her 
intent, we know the content of her command, and “interpretation suffices.” 
Non-interpretive rules of construction appear only when either the 
sovereign’s words do not express her intent or that intent contravenes a 
higher-order law or principle. 
Lieber’s supplemental conception of interpretation and construction 
is a poor fit for the law of contract. Contracts are not commands. And 
although contracting parties enjoy a something like the power to make law 
for themselves, it would be odd to call the private persons who enter into 
contracts “sovereigns.” It is not the parties’ intent that makes the legal 
obligation. It is the law of contract, which attaches legal consequences to 
their exchange agreement, sometimes in the absence of an expressed intent 
                                                                                                                     
for them, for each complex case would require its own provision and 
rule.”). 
18 Id. at 166. See also id. at 115 (“But it is not said that interpretation is all 
that shall guide us, and . . . there are considerations, which ought to induce 
us to abandon interpretation, or with other words to sacrifice the direct 
meaning of a text to considerations still weightier; especially not to 
slaughter justice, the sovereign object of laws, to the law itself, the means of 
obtaining it.”). 
19 See Hart, supra note 8 at 18-25 (describing the command theory); H.L.A. 
Hart, Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons, in H.L.A. Hart, Essays on 
Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory 243 (1982). 
20 See, e.g., Universal Soldier (Studio Canal, 1992). 
21 Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 23. 
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to contract and sometimes despite their expressed intent.22 As the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire observed as far back as 1926, “A 
contract is not a law, nor does it make law. ‘It is the agreement plus the law 
that makes the ordinary contract an enforceable obligation.’”23 The power 
to contract exists only because and only insofar positive law grants it to 
persons. Interpretation of the parties’ intent never suffices to identify their 
legal obligations. 
In the 1951 first edition of his contract treatise, Arthur Linton Corbin 
reconceptualized the interpretation-construction distinction in a way that 
better describes contract exegesis. 
 
By “interpretation of language” we determine what ideas that 
language induces in other persons. By “construction of the 
contract,” as the term will be used here, we determine its legal 
operation—its effect upon the action of courts and administrative 
officials. If we make this distinction, then the construction of a 
contract starts with the interpretation of its language but does not 
end with it; while the process of interpretation stops wholly short of 
a determination of the legal relations of the parties.24 
                                                
22 For more on this idea, see the discussion of contract law’s duty-imposing 
aspect in Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and 
Compound Rule, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726 (2008). 
23 Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 133 A. 4, 6 (N.H. 1926) (quoting Stanley 
v. Kimball, 118 A. 636, 637 (N.H. 1922)). See also Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. 
Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 130, 111 S. Ct. 1156, 1164, 
113 L. Ed. 2d 95 (1991) (“A contract has no legal force apart from the law 
that acknowledges its binding character.”); Groves v. John Wunder Co., 
286 N.W. 235, 239-40 (Minn. 1939) (Olson, J., dissenting) (The “obligation 
of the contract does not inhere or subsist in the agreement itself proprio 
vigore, but in the law applicable to the agreement, that is, in the act of the 
law in binding the promisor to perform his promise. When it is said that one 
who enters upon an undertaking assumes the legal duties relating to it, what 
is really meant is that the law imposes the duties on him. A contract is not a 
law, nor does it make law. It is the agreement plus the law that makes the 
ordinary contract an enforceable obligation.” (quoting 12 Am. Jur., 
Contracts, § 2.). 
24 Arthur Linton Corbin, 3 Corbin on Contracts: A Comprehensive Treatise 
on the Rules of Contract Law § 534, 7 (1951) (hereinafter “Corbin (1st 
edition)”). Those interested in the development of Corbin’s thoughts on the 
interpretation-construction distinction should begin with a passage he 
added on the subject as editor the 1919 third American edition of Anson’s 
Principles of the Law of Contracts. William Reynell Anson, Principles of the 
Law of Contract: With a Chapter on the Law of Agency, 14th English ed., 
3rd American ed. § 353, 405-06 (Arthur L. Corbin ed. 1919) (reprinted in 
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Whereas Lieber describes construction as supplementing interpretation, 
Corbin conceives of construction more generally as the activity of 
determining the legal consequences of contracting parties’ words and 
actions.25 Determining those consequences might require interpretation. But 
interpretation alone tells us only what some persons said, meant or 
intended: “the process of interpretation stops wholly sort of a determination 
of the legal relations of the parties.” We require a rule of construction to 
determine which sayings or meanings or intendings of what legal actors 
have what legal effects. On Corbin’s picture, construction does not 
supplement interpretation but complements it. Construction does not begin 
when interpretation ends, for the parties’ contractual obligations always 
depend on a rule of construction, even when that rule provides that their 
contractual obligations are the ones they intended.26 
Although this point is perhaps especially obvious when it comes to 
the law of contracts, it applies to legal exegesis generally. Recall Hart’s 
argument that law is more than the sovereign’s command backed by the 
                                                                                                                     
Arthur L. Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, 28 Yale L.J. 739, 740-
41 (1919)). 
25 Corbin expressly rejects Lieber’s account of interpretation and 
construction. 3 Corbin (1st edition) § 534, 11, n.11. 
26 If one looks, one finds the seeds of this complementary conception in 
Lieber. There is a difference in kind between a text that does not answer a 
legal question because it is internally contradictory, ambiguous or contains 
gaps, and one whose definite meaning contravenes a higher-order rule. 
Lieber recognizes cases of the latter type, which suggest that rules of 
construction always lurk in the background, as they reflect limits on the 
sovereign’s authority. Thus near the end a chapter on construction, Lieber 
writes: 
We have seen that interpretation means nothing more than finding 
out the true sense and meaning. But it is not said that interpretation 
is all that shall guide us, and . . . there are considerations, which 
ought to induce us to abandon interpretation, or with other words to 
sacrifice the direct meaning of a text to considerations still 
weightier; especially not to slaughter justice, the sovereign object of 
laws, to the law itself, the means of obtaining it. In this respect, 
interpretation is much like political economy, a highly useful 
science, yet, withal, its object is to ascertain the laws which regulate 
the physical existence of society, and there are subjects superior to 
this. 
Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 115. Whereas my argument is a 
conceptual one, Lieber’s explanation sounds in the register of political 
morality. It might be summarized—appropriately, given this colloquium’s 
venue—as: Law is but the means, justice is the end. 
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threat of force. A mature legal system includes rules of recognition, which 
specify “the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and 
adjudication” and “must be effectively accepted as common public 
standards of official behavior by its officials.”27 In a mature legal system 
such as ours, the command of the sovereign is law only because it satisfies 
an accepted rule of recognition. It is a rule of recognition that gives the 
sovereign the power to issue new laws and specifies how she can exercise 
that power. Rules of recognition, in turn, include rules of construction—
rules that specify how the sovereign’s words and actions can effect a legal 
change. If one follows Hart on this point, the complementary conception of 
interpretation and construction is a general one. 
Although the idea can be obscured by his emphasis on the 
“construction zone,” Lawrence Solum also advocates a complementary 
conception of constitutional interpretation and construction. Solum calls 
this the “Two Moments Model.” 
 
In some cases, judges may attend only to interpretation (because 
construction seems obvious and intuitive). In other cases, judges 
may focus entirely on construction; this is especially likely when an 
area of constitutional law involves a provision that is highly vague 
and abstract, or when case law provides a thick and complex body 
of constitutional doctrines. In the former cases, construction may be 
tacit and unconscious, while in the latter cases, interpretation may 
be invisible.28 
 
That said, because he is an originalist, Solum emphasizes Lieber’s ordering: 
interpretation first, construction second. In the discussion that follows, I 
focus on how relevant rules of construction determine what counts as the 
correct approach to interpretation—ways in which rules of construction, 
which call for legal and political justifications rather than philosophical-
linguistic ones, precede and structure legal interpretation. 
2.2 There are multiple meanings of “meaning,” which correspond to 
multiple types of interpretation 
Although Lieber and Corbin have different understandings of the 
relationship between interpretation and construction, each has a relatively 
narrow conception of meaning. For Lieber, “[t]rue sense is . . . the meaning 
which the person or persons, who made use of the words, intended to 
                                                
27 Hart, supra note 8 at 116.  
28 Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 
Fordham L. Rev. 453, 499 (2013). See also id. at 481-82. What I am calling 
the “supplemental conception” is something like what Solum calls the 
“Alternative Methods Model.” Id. at 498. 
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convey to others, whether he used them correctly, skillfully, logically or 
not.”29 Corbin employs a more listener-centered account of meaning, but 
one that is similarly unequivocal. “By ‘interpretation of language’ we 
determine what ideas that language induces in other persons.”30 Although 
their conceptions differ, both Lieber and Corbin assume that meaning is a 
simple concept—and accordingly that interpretation is always the same 
activity. 
Contemporary theories of language reject such assumptions. Since 
at least the early twentieth century, language theorists have differentiated 
multiple types of meaning that a single speech act—a text, utterance, or 
other communicative act—can have. J.L. Austin, for example, distinguished 
between a speech act’s locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary 
forces—roughly what the speaker’s words literally mean, what the speaker 
intends to say with them, and what the speaker intends to accomplish by so 
saying.31 And today linguists commonly differentiate between a speech act’s 
pragmatic meaning—the best interpretation of the speaker’s communicative 
intentions—and its semantic meaning—its conventional meaning, which 
can be identified independently of the speaker’s apparent intentions.32 
Behind the suggestion that there are multiple types of meaning is the 
idea that meaning is not something just out there, waiting to be 
discovered—in the way, say, water on Mars might be. Meaning is the 
product of interpretive practices—in the first instance the interpretive 
practices of members of the linguistic community in which a speech act 
occurs, and sometimes also the interpretive practices of persons outside that 
community.33 This is not to deny that a speech act’s meaning is a fact about 
the world, or that there are better or worse interpretations of it. But its 
meaning is a social fact, one whose existence depends on the relevant 
                                                
29 Lieber, Legal and Political Hermeneutics at 23. See also id. at 19 (“[I]t is 
necessary for him, for whose benefit [a sign] is intended, to find out, what 
those persons who use the sign, intend to convey to the mind of the 
beholder or hearer.”). 
30 3 Corbin (1st edition) § 534, 7. 
31 J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, 94-108 (1962). 
32 These definitions, which I think are the most productive for legal 
applications, oversimplify. Robyn Carston identifies five separate ways 
scholars have tried to draw the distinction between pragmatic meaning and 
semantic meaning. Robyn Carston, Linguistic Communication and the 
Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction, 165 Synthese 321, 322 (2008). And the 
topic is rich enough to the subject of at least one doctoral dissertation. 
Börjesson, Kristin. The Semantics-Pragmatics Controversy (2014). See also 
Kent Bach, The Semantics/Pragmatic Distinction: What It Is and Why It 
Matters, Linguistische Berichte, Sonderheft 8, 33 (1997). 
33 On the last point, think about the meanings a group of experimental 
psychologists might assign to the words of children they are observing. 
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social interpretive practices. And because there are multiple, sometimes 
overlapping social interpretive practices, there are multiple, sometimes 
overlapping types of meaning. Which interpretive practice we deploy in 
given situation—what type of meaning we care about—depends on the 
goal of the inquiry. 
Although Corbin employs a simple theory of meaning, contract law 
too distinguishes among multiple types of meaning. The relevant questions 
can, without too much violence to the phenomena, be grouped under three 
headings: Whose meaning governs? What type of meaning governs? And 
what facts determine that meaning? 
Whose meaning governs? Contracts are generated by the 
communications of two or more parties, sometimes directed towards 
potential third-party enforcers. Because different people can attach different 
meanings to the same words or actions, contract disputes sometimes raise 
the question of whose meaning is legally relevant. 
Various answers have been given.34 To begin with a somewhat 
obscure example, in the 1890 first edition of his contracts treatise Joseph 
Chitty recommends William Paley’s rule for promises: contractual 
obligations should turn on the speaker’s understanding of how the hearer 
understood her. “Where the terms of promise admit of more senses than 
one, the promise is to be performed in that sense in which the promiser 
apprehended, at the time, that the promisee received it.”35 Another, more 
familiar answer to the “whose meaning” question is the strong version of 
the so-called objective theory. According to that rule, the meaning of 
neither party controls, but the objectively reasonable understanding of their 
words in the circumstances in which those words were used. Thus Learned 
Hand famously opined: 
 
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or 
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached 
by the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, 
which ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, 
                                                
34 Calamari and Perillo, for example, identify six possible answers to the 
question “whose meaning is to be given to an agreement.” John D. 
Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, Plea for a Uniform Parol Evidence Rule and 
Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 Ind. L.J. 333, 345-46 (1967). Their 
list is incomplete, as it does not include Chitty’s suggestion, discussed in 
this paragraph. 
35 Joseph Chitty, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts and upon the Defences 
to Actions Thereon, 12th Ed. 127 (1890) (quoting William Paley, The 
Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy 58 (1819)). For a contemporary 
criticism, see Fredrik Pollock, Principles of Contract: A Treatise on the 
General Principles Concerning the Validity of Agreements in the Law of 
England, 5th Edition 235 (1889). 
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however, it were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when 
he used the words, intended something else than the usual meaning 
which the law imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless 
there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort.36 
 
The Second Restatement adopts a third option and mixed rule. 
Oversimplifying a bit, when the parties’ subjective meanings converge—
when they have the same actual understandings of the agreement—those 
subjective meanings govern; when the parties attach different subjective 
meanings to their words and actions, the words’ objective meaning 
governs.37 Under this rule, contract interpretation should in principle begin 
by looking to the parties’ actual, or subjective, understandings, and look to 
objective meaning only when there is a subjective disagreement.38 
There is occasionally a second variety of question under the “whose 
meaning” heading. Parties sometimes agree to writings that they have not 
themselves authored. In so-called contracts of adhesion, one party drafts a 
written agreement that it gives to the other on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. In 
other contractual agreements, the parties use an off-the-rack form contract 
drafted by an industry association or purchased from a commercial source. 
In either type of transaction, one might distinguish between the author of 
the agreement and its authorizer, again raising the question of whose 
understanding should control. 
 Although it is rarely put this way, the possible gap between the 
author of a contractual agreement and the parties who authorize it raises 
interesting questions. Because contracts are first and foremost private 
transactions, authorizer meaning—the meaning the parties’ attach to their 
words—is generally speaking more salient than author meaning. But the 
contra proferentem rule provides that an ambiguous agreement will be 
interpreted against the drafting party. Thus when only one party authors the 
agreement, courts sometimes discount its understanding, even though it is 
also an authorizer. Alternatively, when an industry association or other 
public entity has drafted the agreement, it might make sense to give weight 
to author understanding, even at the expense of the understanding of one or 
both authorizing parties.39 As compared to the parties, the industry 
                                                
36 Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911). 
37 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 201(1) (1981). For a detailed 
account, see Lawrence M. Solan, Contract as Agreement, 83 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 353 (2007). 
38 In practice, determining the objective meaning of the parties’ words and 
actions pretty much always suffices to decide a controversy, so courts start 
there. 
39 For an example, see Town Bank v. City Real Estate Dev., LLC, 793 
N.W.2d 476, 490-93 (Wis. 2010) (repeating arguments in an amicus brief 
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association that wrote the agreement is likely to have a greater interest in 
and insight into the effects of one or another interpretation on future users 
of it. Insofar as the court’s reading of the standard contract’s words are 
likely to be applied to future parties,40 the industry association’s 
understanding of its meaning might generate the best outcome. 
What type of meaning governs? Whereas the “whose meaning” 
question has long been front and center in contract law, less attention has 
been paid to the different types of meaning a contractual agreement can 
have. Contract theorists have yet to integrate late twentieth-century lessons 
from the philosophy of language into their accounts of contract exegesis.41 
One issue under the “what type of meaning” heading is familiar: the 
existence of local dialects, in contract law often termed “usages of trade.”42 
Courts have long recognized that words can have local conventional 
meanings, especially within merchant communities. Thus Williston, 
following Wigmore, distinguishes between the “popular standard, meaning 
the common and normal sense of words,” and “the local standard, 
including the special usages of a religious sect, a body of traders, and alien 
population, or a local dialect.”43 The Second Restatement provides that 
when both parties know or should be aware of a local standard—for 
example, when both are members of the same merchant community—the 
                                                                                                                     
by the Wisconsin Bankers Association, which had drafted the loan 
agreement at issue in the case). 
40 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211(2) (1981) (a standardized 
writing “is interpreted wherever reasonable as treating alike all those 
similarly situated, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of 
the standard terms of the writing”). 
41 An important exception was Peter Tiersma. See, e.g., Peter Tiesma, The 
Language of Offer and Acceptance:  Speech Acts and the Question of 
Intent, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 189 (1986); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Reassessing 
Unilateral Contracts: The Role of Offer, Acceptance and Promise, 26 U.C. 
Davis L. Rev. 1 (1992); Peter Tiersma, The Language of Silence, 48 Rutgers 
L. Rev. 1 (1995). 
42 “Usages of trade” is used to refer both to specialized meanings that words 
might have among a group of merchants and to the typical practices of 
those merchants. The former usages are relevant to interpretation. The latter 
provide gap fillers, or defaults—which are rules of construction. See 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 220 & 221 (1981) (providing 
respectively rules for “Usage Relevant to Interpretation” and “Usage 
Supplementing an Agreement”). 
43 Samuel Williston, 2 The Law of Contracts § 604, 1162 (1920) (hereinafter 
“Williston (1st edition)”) (quoting John Henry Wigmore, 4 A Treatise on the 
Anglo-American Law of Evidence at Trials at Common Law, § 2641, 3474 
(1905)). 
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words of their agreement are interpreted in accordance with it.44 Thus if 
among rabbit dealers, the word “thousand” is commonly used to refer to 
one-hundred dozen, a contract between merchants to sell rabbits at “60£ 
per thousand” will be read to specify a price of sixty pounds per twelve-
hundred rabbits.45 As between the popular conventional meaning and a 
local conventional meaning, courts will interpret their words in accordance 
with the latter so long as both parties are members of the relevant linguistic 
community. 
A subtler and less theorized question is the choice between 
semantic and pragmatic meaning. Should the parties’ words be interpreted 
in accordance with their literal, or conventional, meanings in some 
language (popular or local), or should they be interpreted in light of one or 
both parties’ actual or apparent communicative intentions. When 
sophisticated parties write out the terms of their agreement, they often 
invest considerable resources ensure that their words conventional 
meanings correspond to their intended agreement. Such agreements are 
unlikely to include figures of speech in which the intended meaning is a 
nonliteral one. But in other contractual agreements one finds gaps between 
the pragmatic and semantic meanings of the parties’ words and actions. 
Joking offers are examples.46 So is sales talk.47 
An example that falls into neither of those familiar categories can be 
found in the casebook staple, Embry v. Hargadine, McKittrick Dry Goods 
Co. Here a Missouri appellate court considered the correct interpretation of 
the words, “Go ahead, you’re all right; get your men out and don’t let that 
worry you,” spoken by the company’s president, McKittrick, to an 
employee, Embry, who was threatening to quit unless given a new 
contract.48 At trial, the jury was instructed to find that there was a contract 
only “if you (the jury) find both parties thereby intended and did contract 
with each other for plaintiff's employment.”49 The appellate court held this 
was an error. “[T]hough McKittrick may not have intended to employ 
Embry by what transpired between them . . ., yet if what McKittrick said 
would have been taken by a reasonable man to be an employment, and 
Embry so understood it, it constituted a valid contract of employment.”50 In 
short, the existence of a contract depended on the objective meaning of the 
president’s statement, not on his subjective understanding of it. What 
                                                
44 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 220 (1981). 
45 Id. Ill. 8 (based on Smith v. Wilson, 3 B. & Ad. 728 (K.B.1832)). 
46 The two classic teaching cases for these rules are Lucy v. Zehmer, 84 
S.E.2d 516 (1954), and Leonard v. Pepsico, 88 F.Supp. 2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999). 
47 E.g., UCC 2-313(2). 
48 105 S.W. 777, 777 (Mo. Ct. App. 1907). 
49 Id. at 778. 
50 Id. at 779. 
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neither the trial nor the appellate court questioned, however, was that the 
outcome did not turn on the literal meaning of the defendant’s words: “Go 
ahead, you’re all right; get your men out and don’t let that worry you.” 
What mattered was the communicative intent—subjective or objective—
behind them. Generally speaking, contract interpretation aims at pragmatic 
meaning. 
Even when courts take a highly textualist approach to the words in a 
written agreement, they do not limit themselves to their semantic meaning. 
Williston, who is commonly identified as a formalist on contract 
interpretation, explained in the first edition of his treatise. 
 
[I]n giving effect to the general meaning of a writing particular 
words are sometimes wholly disregarded, or supplied. Thus “or” 
may be given the meaning of “and,” or vice versa, if the remainder 
of the agreement shows that a reasonable person in the position of 
the parties would so understand it.51 
 
Similarly, the New York Court of Appeals, which takes a textualist approach 
to contract interpretation, has recently affirmed that “[a] written contract 
will be read as a whole, and every part will be interpreted with reference to 
the whole; and if possible it will be so interpreted as to give effect to its 
general purpose.”52 Although conventional meanings obviously figure into 
contract interpretation, that interpretation typically seeks to identify more 
than the semantic content of the parties’ words. It seeks out their pragmatic 
meaning—the parties’ actual, apparent or probable intent in using them. 
An older New York case, William C. Atwater & Co. v. Panama 
Railroad Company, illustrates the salience of pragmatic meaning even to 
highly textualist interpretation. At issue was an installment contract for the 
sale of coal and the legal effect of a clause reading: “Any portion of the 
tonnage remaining unshipped at the date of expiration of this agreement 
shall be considered cancelled without notice.”53 The sentence’s literal, or 
semantic, meaning was that both parties would be released from liability for 
any coal unshipped by the end of the installment period. It was paired, 
however, with a provision that permitted the seller to reduce installments 
upon buyer breach. After the buyer refused to accept shipments and the 
seller exercised its option to halt deliveries, the buyer attempted to avoid all 
liability for undelivered shipments by invoking the above clause. Read 
literally, the provision excused the buyer from liability. But reading the 
agreement as a whole, and in light of the seller’s contractual option to 
reduce installments after buyer breach, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
                                                
51 2 Williston (1st edition) § 619, 1199. 
52 Westmoreland Coal Co. v. Entech, Inc., 100 N.Y.2d 352, 358 (2003) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
53 159 N.E. 418 (N.Y. 1927). 
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the clause’s purpose was to limit the seller’s liability upon exercise of the 
option—and not to insulate the buyer from liability for losses resulting from 
its own breach. “Reason, equity, fairness—all such lights on the probably 
intention of the parties—show what the real agreement was.”54 The 
apparent purpose of the contract term was legally controlling at the expense 
of the words’ literal meaning. Although the literal, or semantic, meanings of 
parties’ words are highly salient, the ultimate goal of contract interpretation 
is usually to get at their pragmatic content—at the parties’ apparent or 
actual intent in using them. 
What facts determine the legally relevant meaning? A third question 
is what types of evidence the interpreter may consider when determining 
the meaning of the parties’ words and actions, in other words, what facts 
determine the legally relevant meaning. This question too is a familiar one. 
Contracts scholars often use New York and California as archetypes of the 
different answers courts give to the “what facts” question. 
As noted above, New York courts employ a textualist rule. It can be 
found, for example, in the New York Court of Appeals’ opinion in W.W.W. 
Associates, Inc. v. Giancontieri: 
 
[W]hen parties set down their agreement in a clear, complete 
document, their writing should as a rule be enforced according to 
its terms. Evidence outside the four corners of the document as to 
what was really intended but unstated or misstated is generally 
inadmissible to add to or vary the writing.55 
 
In New York, extrinsic evidence—evidence other than the text of the 
agreement, the interpreter’s background understanding, and perhaps a 
dictionary—may be introduced only if the writing itself is ambiguous or its 
meaning is otherwise unclear. Moreover, whether the writing is ambiguous 
is also to be determined from the text alone. “[E]xtrinsic and parol evidence 
is not admissible to create an ambiguity in a written agreement which is 
complete and clear and unambiguous upon its face.”56 Courts and scholars 
commonly refer to the meaning that can be gleaned solely from the text of a 
written agreement as its “plain meaning.”57 
                                                
54 Id. at 419. 
55 W.W.W. Assocs., Inc. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (1990). See 
also R/S Assocs. v. N.Y. Job Dev. Auth., 98 N.Y.2d 29, 32 (2002). 
56 Id. at 163 (quoting Intercontinental Planning v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d 
372, 379 (1969)). 
57 As the above discussion shows, plain meaning is a form of pragmatic 
meaning. A written agreement’s plain meaning might not be its literal 
meaning. 
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California’s very different approach appears in Justice Traynor’s 
classic opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & 
Rigging: 
 
The test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the 
meaning of a written instrument is not whether it appears to the 
court to be plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the 
offered evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the 
language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible.58 
 
In other words, when considering a written agreement, the judge may 
always look to extrinsic evidence to determine its possible meanings. 
Interpretation aims not at the writing’s plain meaning, but at the meaning of 
the words in it in light of the context in which they were used. 
Although the New York and California rules are often characterized 
as occupying two sides of a textualist-contextualist divide, the choice of 
interpretive facts is not a binary one.59 Contract law distinguishes among 
multiple types of interpretive inputs. In addition to the words or actions 
whose meaning is at issue, the inputs can include the interpreter’s 
familiarity with language and her background knowledge of the world; 
dictionary definitions and rules of grammar; information about who the 
parties are and the commercial setting of their transaction; evidence of local 
linguistic practices and common terms of trade; other communications 
among or by the parties, especially during negotiations; the parties’ prior 
dealings with one another; and the course of the parties’ performance under 
the contract. Any given rule of contract interpretation can permit more or 
less evidence of meaning, depending on the types of evidence it authorizes 
(it might admit, for example, evidence of usages of trade but not of course 
of performance), on when that evidence is allowed in (always, only when 
the plain meaning is ambiguous, only in informal or nonintegrated 
communications, etc.), on who may consider the evidence (only the judge, 
also the jury), and so forth. The question is not simply whether or not to 
limit the interpretive evidence to the text and a dictionary, but how much 
evidence of what type to allow under what circumstances, where the 
possible answers include “None ever,” “All always,” and many points 
between. 
                                                
58 Pacific Gas, 69 Cal. 2d 33, 37 (1968). 
59 I am not the first to make this point. See Henry E. Smith, The Language of 
Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 Stan. L. Rev. 1105, 1157-66 
(2003) (identifying ways that rules can be designed to achieve a “differential 
formalism”); Avery Weiner Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in 
Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 496, 515-19 (2004) (observing 
several ways in which courts can permit more or less evidence in 
interpretation). 
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The interplay between the three questions. Although the above 
questions—whose meaning, what type of meaning, and what evidence of 
meaning—are logically distinct, there are obvious connections among their 
answers. If contract interpretation were to aim only at literal meaning, for 
example, the question of whose meaning would be answered and the most 
relevant interpretive facts would be those found in dictionaries and 
grammar books. If contract interpretation were to aim only at the parties’ 
subjective understanding of their agreement, the course of their 
performance under it would be of greater evidentiary value than it would 
be under a purely objective theory. And so forth. 
That said, theorists risk confusion by running the different questions 
together. Consider the common division of interpretive theories into 
“textualist” and “purposivist” camps. Although the categories are 
historically descriptive—1980s statutory textualism arose in response to the 
purposivism of Henry Hart and Albert Sacks’s legal process theory60—they 
answer different questions. The core claim of textualism is an evidentiary 
one. To the “what evidence” question, it answers: Interpretation should 
begin, and when possible end, with the text. Purposivism, in distinction, is 
about the type of meaning: A legal text should interpret in light of its 
apparent purpose, perhaps at the expense of its literal meaning. Although 
some versions of purposivism—including Hart and Sacks’s61—recommend 
looking to extratextual evidence of purpose, textualism is perfectly 
compatible with the search for purpose. In fact, as I observed above, 
textualist approaches to contract interpretation commonly also attend to 
parties’ apparent purpose: the writing is to be “read as a whole to determine 
its purpose and intent.”62 
Another mistake is to equate the objective theory, which is about 
whose meaning controls, with textualism, which is again about what facts 
go into interpretation. In Empro Manufacturing v. Ball–Co Manufacturing, 
Judge Easterbrook invokes the principle that “’intent’ in contract law is 
objective rather than subjective,”63 to reach the conclusion that “intent must 
be determined solely from the language used when no ambiguity in its 
terms exists.”64 The one proposition does not follow from the other. It is true 
that extrinsic evidence is especially probative of subjective intent. But the 
                                                
60 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1, 23-29 (2006). 
61 See Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic 
Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1211-54 (W. Eskridge, Jr., 
& P. Frickey, eds. 1994) (discussing the use of legislative history). 
62 Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d at 162.  
63 870 F.2d 423, 425 (8th Cir. 1989). See also Skycom Corp. v. Telstar 
Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814-17 (7th Cir. 1987). 
64 Id. (quoting Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Ill.2d 362, 364 
(1969)). 
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objective theory does not entail that an interpreter should limit herself to 
the words on the page. When interpretation seeks out the understanding of 
a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the parties, evidence of 
context can be essential. The answer to the “whose meaning” question does 
not determine the answer to the “what evidence” question.  
2.3 Because legal interpretation serves construction, the applicable rule of 
construction determines the correct rule of interpretation 
This third structural feature follows fairly closely upon the second. 
Because there are multiple types of meaning and interpretation, we require 
a rule to determine which type is legally relevant—which meaning goes 
into determining a speech act’s legal effects.65 That rule will not be found in 
a theory of language. Theories of language provide at most menus of 
possible meanings, not reasons for picking one or another. The rule that 
determines which meaning is legally relevant is, rather, a rule of 
construction. It is a rule that determines how parties’ words and actions will 
affect their legal obligations. Consequently, although the activity of 
interpretation commonly comes first in the process of exegesis—or as 
Corbin puts it, “A ‘meaning’ must be given to the words before determining 
their legal operation”66—rules of construction enjoy a certain conceptual 
priority. One cannot know what type of meaning to seek out—what rule of 
                                                
65 Cass Sunstein and Richard Fallon have each recently suggested that 
public law texts can have multiple meanings, paralleling my observation 
about contractual agreements. Cass Sunstein, There Is Nothing that 
Interpretation Just Is, 30 Const. Comment. 193, 193 (2015) (“there is 
nothing that interpretation ‘just is,’” and “no approach to constitutional 
interpretation is mandatory”); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal 
“Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. 
Chi. L. Rev. 1235, 1239 (2015) (there is a “diversity of senses of meaning 
that constitute . . . potential ‘referents’ for claims of legal meaning”). 
Neither however, suggests a simple rule for choosing amongst them. 
Sunstein recommends an outcome-based approach the choice among 
interpretive methods in constitutional law. “Among the reasonable 
alternatives, any particular approach to the Constitution must be defended 
on the ground that it makes the relevant constitutional order better rather 
than worse.” 30 Const. Comment. at 212. To date Sunstein he has not made 
an outcome-based case for one or another form of constitutional 
interpretation. Fallon argues that it is a mistake to equate statutory or 
constitutional meaning with any one type of meaning. Rather than selecting 
a single mode of interpretation on the basis of overall outcomes, Fallon 
recommends “a relatively case-by-case approach to selecting” the 
appropriate sort of meaning. 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1303. 
66 Corbin (1st edition) § 534, 8. 
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interpretation to apply—without first knowing the applicable rule of 
construction. 
Here we see a further advantage of the complementary conception 
of the interpretation-construction distinction. Leiber’s supplemental 
conception, which treats construction as necessary only when 
interpretation runs out, cannot explain how the law chooses amongst 
different meanings. The problem is not obvious in the context of Lieber’s 
own theory. Although Lieber distinguishes different approaches to 
interpretation, he rejects the idea that a legal text might have more than one 
meaning.67 Thus when an authoritative text’s one true sense is discernible, it 
decides the issue. 
Lieber’s supplemental conception falls apart if a text does not have 
only one true sense—if “meaning” is ambiguous. Once one abandons 
simple theories of meaning, it is obvious that the law requires a rule for 
choosing among the meanings a single speech act might have. That rule 
will not be a rule of interpretation, but a rule of construction. The diversity 
of meanings therefore provides a further argument for the complementary 
conception of interpretation and construction. 
The point is not merely about the advantages of one or another 
conception of the interpretation-construction distinction. The conceptual 
priority of construction reflects an important fact about the sorts of 
arguments needed to justify legal rules of interpretation. Consider Justice 
Traynor’s argument in Pacific Gas, quoting from Corbin, for interpreting 
written agreements in light of the surrounding circumstances: 
 
Words, however, do not have absolute and constant referents. . . . 
The meaning of particular words or groups of words varies with the 
“verbal context and surrounding circumstances and purposes in 
view of the linguistic education and experience of their users and 
their hearers or readers (not excluding judges). . . . A word has no 
meaning apart from these factors; much less does it have an 
objective meaning, one true meaning.”68 
 
Such appeals to the theory of meaning are relatively common amongst anti-
textualist contract theorists. Melvin Eisenberg argues, “The proper 
interpretation of all purposive expressions, including contractual 
expressions, is necessarily dynamic, because the meaning of a purposive 
                                                
67 Whereas theologians might distinguish between the Bible’s “typical, 
allegorical, parabolical, anagogical, moral and accommodatory senses, and 
of corresponding modes of interpretation, . . . [i]n politics and law we have 
to deal with plain words and human use of them only.” Lieber, Legal and 
Political Hermeneutics at 76. 
68 442 P.2d at 644-45 (quoting Arthur Linton Corbin, The Interpretation of 
Words and the Parol Evidence Rule 50 Cornell L.Q. 161, 187 (1965)). 
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expression is always determined in part by its context, and the context is 
prior to the expression.”69 E. Allen Farnsworth maintains, “The very concept 
of plain meaning finds scant support in semantics, where one of the 
cardinal teachings is the fallibility of language as a means of 
communication.”70 The comments to section 212 of the Second 
Restatement assert that “meaning can almost never be plain except in a 
context.”71 And the comments to section 2-202 of the UCC provide, “This 
section definitively rejects . . . [t]he premise that the language used has the 
meaning attributable to such language by rules of construction existing in 
the law rather than the meaning which arises out of the commercial context 
in which it was used.”72 
These appeals to the theory of language are flawed. It might well be 
that parties in fact understand one another in light of the context, their 
purpose and their linguistic experience. It is not, however, a given that the 
parties’ contractual obligation should track those understandings, or that 
legal interpretation should mirror the parties’ interpretive practices. The 
contextually enriched pragmatic meaning that often anchors the parties’ 
understanding of their agreement is not the only meaning the law might 
look to, and might not even be the meaning that the parties themselves, if 
they thought about it, would want to control.73 Deciding which meaning 
should govern requires considering more than the theory of language. With 
respect to contractual interpretation, relevant considerations include: 
(a) costs of drafting; (b) costs of litigation; (c) the ability of third-party 
enforcers to accurately identify one or another type of meaning; 
                                                
69 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, in 2 
Theoretical Inq. L. 1, 27 (2001). 
70 E. Allen Farnsworth, “Meaning” in the Law of Contracts, 76 Yale L.J. 939, 
952 (1967). See also E. Allan Farnsworth, Contracts § 7.10, 454 (4th ed. 
2004) (“Indeed, it is questionable whether a word has meaning at all when 
divorced from the circumstances in which it is used.”). 
71 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 212 cmt. b. Cf. 3 Corbin (1st edition) 
§ 542, 100-02 (“[S]ome of the surrounding circumstances always must be 
known before the meaning of the words can be plain and clear.”). A similar 
claim can be found in the comments to section 214 of the Second 
Restatement: 
Words, written or oral, cannot apply themselves to the subject 
matter. . . . Even though words seem on their face to have only a 
single possible meaning, other meanings often appear when the 
circumstances are disclosed. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 214, cmt. b. 
72 U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 1. 
73 The latter point is argued at length in Schwartz & Scott, supra note 13, 
and Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of 
Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1023 (2009). 
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(d) predictability of outcomes; (e) how responsive parties are to the 
incentives legal interpretive rules generate, and especially whether they are 
likely to draft their agreements to take account of those rules; (f) relational 
costs, both of putting everything into an agreement and of interpretive rules 
that give legal effect to behavior outside of a writing; (g) parties’ expressed 
or probable preference with respect to how their agreement is interpreted; 
and (h) more generally, society’s reasons for attaching legal consequences 
to exchange agreements.74 Other factors will be relevant in other areas of 
the law. But in all instances, the reasons for picking one or another 
meaning will be found in political and legal principles, policies and 
practicalities, not in the theory of language. The choice requires a rule of 
construction, and rules of construction are creatures of law. 
2.4 When one type of interpretation runs out, another type might step in 
On the supplemental conception, when interpretation fails to 
attribute to the text a legally effective meaning, noninterpretive rules of 
construction step in. Perhaps something like this idea lies behind Randy 
Barnett’s suggestion that “[w]hen original meaning runs out, constitutional 
‘interpretation,’ strictly speaking, is over, and some new noninterpretive 
activity must supplement the information revealed by interpretation.”75 But 
if there are multiple types of meaning, and therefore multiple approaches to 
interpretation, a rule of construction might specify that when one type of 
interpretation runs out, another type steps in. 
In fact this is how contract law often proceeds. I have already 
mentioned two examples. Courts that adopt a textualist approach to written 
agreements regularly consider extratextual facts to resolve textual 
ambiguities. When textualist interpretation runs out, another interpretive 
rule steps in. And the Restatement provides that when interpretation of 
subjective meaning does not produce a single result, objective meaning 
controls. If the parties’ subjective understandings of their word and actions 
agree, that meaning governs; if their subjective understandings conflict, 
their legal obligations are determined by the objective meaning of their 
words and actions. 
The existence of rules of construction that specify more than one 
type of meaning entails that is doubly wrong to divide the activity of 
                                                
74 For other lists of relevant factors, see Katz, Avery Weiner Katz, The 
Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation, 104 Colum. L. 
Rev. 496, 522-36 (2004); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, The Plain 
Meaning Rule, and The Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. Pa. 
L. Rev. 533, 543-47 (1998). 
75 Randy Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 Fordham L. 
Rev. 411, 419 (2013). Or Barnett’s claim might rest on a substantive 
commitment, e.g., to originalism. 
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exegesis into two distinct stages: first interpretation and second 
construction. Not only do the correct rules of interpretation depend on the 
relevant rule of construction—what I have called the conceptual priority of 
construction—but a rule of construction might specify multiple stages of 
interpretation. 
3 Interpretation and Construction in Constitutional Law: Joseph Story 
and Thomas Cooley 
I believe the above claims about the nature of and relationship 
between interpretation and construction are true of legal exegesis generally. 
Identifying the effect of any legal text or other speech act requires knowing 
more than its meaning. Any legal speech act might be subjected to different 
types of interpretation, to which correspond various types of meaning. The 
choice among meanings cannot be resolved by the theory of language, but 
always involves considerations of principle, policy and practicality. And the 
existence of multiple types of meaning generally entails that when one type 
of interpretation runs out, another might step in. 
Depending on one’s tastes, it would be either very interesting or 
very tedious to explore how those claims apply across the entire range of 
legal exegesis. That is not the project of this Article. But the topic of the 
2018 Salmon P. Chase Faculty Colloquium provides an opportunity to 
illustrate the value of the above analysis for understanding two nineteenth-
century approaches to constitutional interpretation. The remainder of this 
Article argues that the above theory of interpretation and construction 
provides a useful framework for understanding Thomas Cooley’s and Joseph 
Story’s accounts of constitutional interpretation. 
Cooley’s 1868 A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations which rests 
on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union is largely a 
discussion of state constitutions.76 Cooley’s treatise nonetheless draws 
heavily on Story’s 1833 Commentaries on the Constitution of the United 
States.77 Although Cooley briefly mentions the interpretation-construction 
distinction at the outset of his chapter on constitutional interpretation, 
neither he nor Story incorporates it into his theory of constitutional 
exegesis.78 Nonetheless, distinguishing the two activities and the types of 
                                                
76 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations which 
rests on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (1868) 
(hereinafter “Cooley (1st edition)”). 
77 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 
(1833) (hereinafter “Story (1st edition)”). After the publication of his 
Treatise, Cooley served as editor of the 1873 fourth edition of Story’s 
Commentaries. 
78 At the outset of the chapter “Of the Construction of State Constitutions” in 
the first edition of his treatise, Cooley briefly discusses Lieber’s distinction 
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rules that govern each provides critical insight into Cooley and Story’s 
shared approach to constitutional exegesis. More specifically, each of the 
four structural features identified in Part Two—the complementarity of 
interpretation and construction, the multiple meanings of “meaning,” the 
conceptual priority of rules of construction, and the fact that when one type 
of interpretation runs out, another can step in—appears in both Story’s and 
Cooley’s theories. 
The starting point for understanding Story’s and Cooley’s accounts 
of constitutional exegesis is their shared answer to the “whose meaning” 
question. Each in the course of his analysis recognizes at least three 
possible answers. The legally relevant meaning of the constitutional text 
might be the meaning it had for those who drafted the documents—
participants in the Philadelphia Convention or state analogs. This is a form 
of author meaning that I will call “framer meaning.” Where a constitution 
was ratified by an elected body, as the U.S. Constitution was by state 
conventions called specially for that purpose, the relevant meaning might 
be the understandings of members of the ratifying bodies. Call this “ratifier 
meaning.” Finally, the relevant meaning might be the meaning the text had 
at the time of ratification for the public at large, or its “public meaning.” 
How Story and Cooley go about picking among these meanings illustrates 
the conceptual priority of construction. Their arguments for public meaning 
can be broken down into two parts. 
                                                                                                                     
between interpretation and construction. Cooley (1st edition) at 33, n. 1; 
see also Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 
which rests on the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union 
40-41 (2d ed. 1871). But Cooley does not distinguish between the two 
activities in his account of constitutional exegesis. In the 1871 second 
edition, Cooley explains that “[i]n common use, however, the word 
construction is generally employed in the law in a sense embracing all that 
is properly covered by both when used in a sense strictly and technically 
correct; and we shall so employ it in the present chapter.” Id. at 41. The 
first edition of Story’s Commentaries was published six years before Lieber 
published his book on the interpretation-construction distinction. Story 
neither anticipates the distinction in the first edition nor incorporates it into 
later editions. 
 Theodore Sedgwick is perhaps the nineteenth century treatise writer 
who follows Lieber most closely, though Sedgwick writes that he does not 
consider the interpretation-construction distinction “of much value for the 
student of jurisprudence.” Theodore Sedgwick, A Treatise on the Rules 
which Govern the Interpretation and Application of Statutory and 
Constitutional Law 227 (1857). The structure of Sedgwick’s discussion of 
statutory interpretation follows Lieber’s distinction: Chapter Six provides 
rules of interpretation aimed at discerning legislative intent; Chapter Seven 
discusses how judges should decide cases when interpretation runs out.  
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The first is the thesis, shared with Lieber, that the goal of legal 
interpretation is to discover the sovereign lawgiver’s intent. Story puts the 
point as follows: “The first and fundamental rule in the interpretation of all 
instruments is, to construe them according to the sense of the terms, and the 
intention of the parties.”79 Or Cooley: “In the case of all written laws, it is 
the intent of the lawgiver that is to be enforced.”80 As in Lieber, this thesis 
suggests a command theory of law. Because law is the command of the 
sovereign, legal interpretation should seek to discover that sovereign’s 
intent. 
It follows that the answer to the “whose meaning” question cannot 
be framer meaning. The framers of the state and federal constitutions did 
not authorize the constitutional texts; they merely authored them. 
Consequently, constitutional interpretation should not give any special 
weight to the proceedings at drafting conventions or to framers’ 
understandings of the resulting texts. Cooley’s explanation of the difference 
between a constitution and ordinary legislation nicely illustrates the 
importance of the distinction between author and authorizer. 
 
For as the constitution does not derive its force from the convention 
which framed, but from the people who ratified it, the intent to be 
arrived at is that of the people. . . . These proceedings therefore are 
less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are 
legislative proceedings of the proper construction of a statute; since 
in the latter case it is the intent of the legislature we seek, while in 
the former we are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people 
through the discussions and deliberations of their representatives.81 
 
In ordinary legislation author and authorizer at least overlap. The legislative 
text is typically authored by a committee of legislators, sometimes amended 
by the legislature as a whole, and then authorized by the legislature as a 
whole.82 A constitution, in distinction, is more akin to a standard form 
contract: the author is not the authorizer. And according to the command 
                                                
79 Story (1st edition) at 383. 
80 Cooley (1st edition) at 55. 
81 Cooley (1st edition) at 66-67. See also Story at 392 n.1 (making a similar 
point in response to Jefferson’s suggestion that constitutional interpretation 
look to the records of the Philadelphia and ratifying conventions: “The 
people adopted the constitution according to the words of the text in their 
reasonable interpretation, and not according to the private interpretation of 
any particular men. The opinions of the latter may sometimes aid us in 
arriving at just results; but they can never be conclusive.”). 
82 For an account of how it is we can assign collective intentions, including 
collective communicative intentions, to legislative bodies, see Victoria 
Nourse, Misreading Law, Misreading Democracy (2016). 
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theory, it is only the intent of the latter that matters. Framer meaning is 
rejected on the basis of a political claim about whose meaning matters: that 
of the sovereign who authorizes the constitution. 
The second component of Story and Cooley’s answer to the “whose 
meaning” question is their shared position that in the United States the 
people are sovereign, and that a constitution’s legal authority, whether state 
or federal, derives from its authorization by the people. Story opens his 
Chapter Five account of constitutional interpretation with an extended 
discussion. 
 
In our future commentaries upon the constitution we shall treat it, 
then, as it is denominated in the instrument itself, as a CONSTITUTION 
of government, ordained and established by the people of the 
United States for themselves and their posterity. They have declared 
it the supreme law of the land. They have made it a limited 
government. They have defined its authority. They have restrained it 
to the exercise of certain powers, and reserved all others to the 
states or to the people. It is a popular government. Those who 
administer it are responsible to the people. It is as popular, and just 
as much emanating from the people, as the state governments. It is 
created for one purpose; the state governments for another. It may 
be altered, and amended, and abolished at the will of the people. In 
short, it was made by the people, made for the people, and is 
responsible to the people.83 
 
Cooley articulates a similar view of both the national constitution and state 
constitutions. 
 
The theory of our political system is that the ultimate sovereignty is 
in the people, from whom springs all legitimate authority. They 
have created a national Constitution, and conferred upon it powers 
of sovereignty over certain subjects, and they create State 
governments upon which they confer the remaining powers of 
sovereignty, so far as they are disposed to allow them to be 
exercised at all.84 
                                                
83 Story (1st edition) at 382 (footnote omitted). 
84 Cooley (1st edition) at 28 (footnote omitted). 
Cooley was less a theorist than was Story. The above passage is 
supported not by an argument, but by a citation to Justice McLean’s 
opinion, riding circuit, in Spooner v. McConnell, 1 McLean 337, 347 
(1838). Id. at 28 n. 3. And whereas Story speaks from within the theory of 
popular sovereignty, Cooley speaks as if he is reporting it the theory of the 
U.S. political system—from the perspective of an observer rather than 
participant. Thus the above passage is followed by a discussion of the 
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It follows that the meaning that matters for constitutional interpretation is 
not ratifier meaning, but the text’s public meaning. If the goal of legal 
interpretation is to get at the intent of the sovereign who authorized the 
legal text (the first component of the argument), and if constitutions are 
authorized by the sovereign people (the second component), then the 
proper aim of constitutional interpretation is to identify the public meaning 
of the constitutional text. “[T]he real question is what the people meant.” 85 
To the reader not steeped in the early nineteenth century 
constitutional debates, this appeal to popular sovereignty might read like a 
bland invocation of the Lockean contractualist tradition. But Story’s 
popular-sovereignty theory of the U.S. Constitution was taking sides in one 
of the more contentious political-theoretical debates of the time.86 The 
division was between those who viewed the Constitution as a compact 
between the states, or between the people of the several states, and those 
who viewed it as authorized by the people of the United States a whole.87 
For my purposes, a few examples of the compact view suffice to identify the 
highly political quality of Story’s theory of national popular sovereignty. 
Richard Tuck has observed that at the time of the founding there 
was widespread agreement that the U.S. Constitution required ratification 
not by state legislatures, as the Articles of Confederation had been, but by 
specially constituted assemblies.88 Circumventing state legislatures, 
however, did not preclude a view of the Constitution as a compact among 
the several states. Tuck takes George Mason’s views as exemplary. 
 
It should be noted (since the issue became hugely important in the 
latter interpretation of the Constitution) that at least in Mason’s eyes 
an appeal to the people over the heads of the legislatures was 
                                                                                                                     
limited franchise, in which Cooley makes clear that he is merely reporting 
the judgment of the polity as to who should have the franchise, not treating 
that judgment as justified. “What should be the correct rule on this subject, 
it does not fall within our province to consider.” Id. at 29. For a more 
ambitious post-Civil War argument for a national popular-sovereignty 
theory, see John Alexander Jameson, The Constitutional Convention: Its 
History, Powers, and Modes of Proceeding 17-65 (1867). 
85 Cooley (1st edition) at 61. 
86 Cooley’s adoption of a similar position on state constitutions was less 
controversial. See Richard Tuck, The Sleeping Sovereign: The Invention of 
Modern Democracy 191-97 (2016) (describing the use of plebiscites to 
ratify state constitutions in the period between 1778 and the beginning of 
the Civil War). 
87 Richard Tuck provides a good overview of how that divide played out 
over time. Id. at 181-242. 
88 Id. at 206-07. 
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compatible with the separate identity of those people in their 
respective states; it was possible to believe in the necessity of a 
democratic process within each state as the guarantee of the federal 
Constitution’s legitimacy, without believing that the people had 
created a new and unitary nation.89 
 
The compact-theory of the Constitution found application in the 1798 and 
1799 Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, which purported to adjudge 
unconstitutional the federal Alien and Sedition Acts. Each maintained that 
because the Constitution was a compact between the states, the states had 
the power to determine violations of it.90 In his 1803 edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, George Tucker gave a systematic account of the theory. The 
Constitution was for Tucker “a compact freely, voluntarily and solemnly 
entered into by the several states, and ratified by the people thereof, 
                                                
89 Id. at 207. Tuck reads Madison as articulating a similar argument in 
Federalist 39, though Federalist 39 maintained that the Constitution would 
also have a national character. For example: 
That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms are 
understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming so 
many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is 
obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither 
from the decision of a majority of the people of the Union, nor from 
that of a majority of the States. 
George w. Carey & James McClellan (eds.), The Federalist 197 (2001). 
90 The Virginia Resolution provided: 
[T]his Assembly doth explicitly and peremptorily declare, that it 
views the powers of the federal government, as resulting from the 
compact, to which the states are parties;  . . . and that in case of a 
deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not 
granted by the said compact, the states who are parties thereto, have 
the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose for arresting the 
progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective 
limits, the authorities, rights and liberties appertaining to them. 
Virginia Resolutions of 1798 in Jonathan Elliot, ed., 4 Debates in the Several 
State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, as 
Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in 1787 554, 
554 (2nd ed., 1888). The Kentucky Resolutions similarly provided that “the 
several states who formed [the federal Constitution], being sovereign and 
independent, have the unquestionable right to judge of its infraction; and 
that a nullification, by those sovereignties, of all unauthorized acts done 
under colour of that instrument, is the rightful remedy.” Kentucky 
Resolutions of 1799, id. at 566, 571. 
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respectively.”91 Tucker drew from this a rule of construction: The powers of 
the federal government were only those expressly innumerate in the 
constitution, 
 
for, expressum facit taccre tacituni is a maxim in all cases of 
construction: it is likewise a maxim of political law, that sovereign 
states cannot be deprived of any of their rights by implication; nor 
in any manner whatever but by their own voluntary consent, or by 
submission to a conqueror.92 
 
Citing Tucker and others, H. Jefferson Powell has argued that in the first 
decade of the nineteenth century, “the constitutional theory of the Virginia 
and Kentucky resolutions established itself as American political 
orthodoxy,” an orthodoxy that “stood virtually unquestioned until the 
nullification crisis of 1828 through 1832.”93 
Whether or not the compact theory ever attained the status of 
orthodoxy,94 there is no doubt but that in his 1833 Commentaries Story set 
out to refute it, and to give an alternative account of the authorization and 
authority of the US Constitution. Chapter Three of the Commentaries, titled 
“Nature of the Constitution—Whether a Compact,” provides a detailed 
criticism of Tucker’s theory.95 Story’s arguments range from high political 
theory to a close reading of the constitutional text. Interesting though the 
details are, the important point for my purposes is that they all sound in the 
register of jurisprudence, political theory, history and textual analysis. The 
Chapter provides a jurisprudential theory of the Constitution, which in turn 
provides the basis for Story’s answer in Chapter Five to the “whose 
                                                
91 1 Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, to the 
Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Government of the United States; and 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia 155 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803). See 
also id. at 148 (“It is a federal compact; several sovereign and independent 
states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without 
each ceasing to be a perfect state.”) & 169 (“It is a compact by which the 
several states and the people thereof, respectively, have bound themselves 
to each other, and to the federal government.”). 
92 Tucker at 143. 
93 H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 
Harv. L. Rev. 885, 934, 935 (1985). See also H. Jefferson Powell, Joseph 
Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution: A Belated Review, 94 Yale L.J. 
1285, 1302 (1985) (describing the constitutional argument behind the 
South Carolina Exposition of 1828). 
94 For a critical assessment of Powell’s use of original sources, see Charles 
A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 Const. Comm. 
77 (1988). 
95 Story (1st edition) at 279-343. 
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meaning” question.96 Because it was the people as a whole authorized the 
Constitution, it is their understanding of the document that matters, and not 
that of the participants at state ratifying conventions. The answer is not 
given by the theory of language, but by a rule of construction that, on the 
basis of legal and political considerations, determines which meaning 
matters. This is the conceptual priority of construction. 
Story’s arguments about the nature of sovereignty in the United 
States can appear quaint to a modern, realist eye—akin to arguments about 
the actual location a business incorporated in one state with agents in 
another.97 But the “whose meaning” question has hardly disappeared from 
constitutional theory. It lies, for example, at the bottom of the disagreement 
between original-intent originalists and original-meaning originalists. 
Original-intent originalism recommends interpretation of the framers’ intent 
or purpose when they drafted the constitutional text. Original-meaning 
originalism recommends interpretation of how, at the time of drafting, 
ordinary citizens would have understood the constitutional text. The 
disagreement is in one sense about what constitutional interpretation 
should look like. But it cannot be answered by the theory of meaning alone. 
Neither side denies that one might interpret the constitution as the other 
side advocates. The question is which type of meaning should make a legal 
difference. That is a question not of interpretation, but of construction. Its 
answer will be found not in the theory of language, but in political 
principles, policy priorities and practical considerations.98 
In Section 2.2 I distinguished three categories of questions regarding 
the various meanings a legal speech act can have: Whose meaning matters? 
What type of meaning matters? And what facts go into the determination of 
the meaning that matters? And I observed that, though the questions are 
analytically distinct, their answers are often practically connected. The 
answer to one of the questions often informs answers to the others. 
                                                
96 Story was also an advocate, and marshaled more than one argument for 
his answer to the whose meaning question. Thus he also observed the 
diversity of opinion at the ratifying conventions provide neither the 
certainty nor the uniformity necessary for a foundational document. Story 
(1st edition) at 388-89. This is an argument that relies on practical legal 
considerations, rather than political principle. It too, however, extends 
beyond the theory of meaning. 
97 The example, of course, is from Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 809-12 (1935). 
98 Jack Balkin makes a similar point with respect to constitutional history 
generally: “[I]n constitutional construction, history is a resource, not a 
command. . . . [H]ow history is used and how it becomes relevant depends 
on each modality’s underlying theory of justification.” Balkin, supra note 2 
at 652. 
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This dynamic too can be seen in both Cooley and Story. Their 
answers to the “whose meaning” question—public meaning—informs other 
aspects of their theories of constitutional interpretation. We can start with a 
choice among various conventional, or semantic, meanings a constitutional 
text can have. Both Story and Cooley recognize that a single word in a 
constitution might have multiple conventional meanings. Where contract 
law emphasizes the difference between popular meanings and usages of 
trade, Story and Cooley discuss that between popular meanings and 
technical legal meanings. Both maintain that legal terms of art, such as 
“habeas corpus,” must be read in their technical senses. But, they argue, 
ordinary words in a constitution should be read in accordance with their 
popular meanings.99 Cooley explains: “Narrow and technical reasoning is 
misplaced when it is brought to bear upon an instrument framed by the 
people themselves, for themselves, and designed as a chart upon which 
every man, learned and unlearned, may be able to trace the leading 
principles of government.”100 Or as Story puts the point: 
 
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, 
for niceties of expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades 
of meaning, or for the exercise of philosophical acuteness, or 
judicial research. . . . The people make them; the people adopt 
them; the people must be supposed to read them, with the help of 
common sense; and cannot be presumed to admit in them any 
recondite meaning, or any extraordinary gloss.101 
 
The choice among semantic meanings turns on Story and Cooley’s answer 
to the “whose meaning” question. In contract law, the relevance of the 
parties’ understanding (whose meaning) suggests taking account of relevant 
usages of trade (what type of meaning); in Story’s and Cooley’s 
constitutional theories, the relevance of the people’s understanding (whose 
meaning) suggests attending to the text’s popular meaning rather than any 
technical legal meaning it might have (what type of meaning). 
Another distinction among types of meaning is that between a text’s 
semantic and its pragmatic meanings. Although Story did not have the 
technical tools to draw it, he recognizes something like the distinction. At 
the outset of his chapter on constitutional interpretation, Story catalogues 
various types of interpretation identified by other theorists. One is Thomas 
                                                
99 Cooley (1st edition) at 58 (“In interpreting clauses we must presume that 
words have been employed in their natural and ordinary meaning.”); Story 
(1st edition) at 436 (“[E]very word employed in the constitution is to be 
expounded in its plain, obvious, and common sense, unless the context 
furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.”). 
100 Cooley (1st edition) at 59. 
101 Story (1st edition) at 436-37. 
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Rutherforth’s differentiation, in his lectures on Grotius, between “literal” 
and “rational” interpretation. 
 
The first [literal interpretation] is, where we collect the intention of 
the party from his words only, as they lie before us. The second 
[rational interpretation] is, where his words do not express that 
intention perfectly, but exceed it, or fall short of it, and we are to 
collect it from probable or rational conjectures only.102 
 
Story relates Rutherforth’s categories to one understanding of the difference 
between “strict” and “large” interpretation. 
 
[A]s, on the one hand, we call it a strict interpretation, where we 
contend, that the letter is to be adhered to precisely; so, on the other 
hand, we call it a large interpretation, where we contend, that the 
words ought to be taken in such a sense, as common usage will not 
fully justify; or that the meaning of the legislator is something 
different from what his words in any usage would import. In this 
sense a large interpretation is synonymous with what has before 
been called a rational interpretation.103 
 
Story maintains that constitutional interpretation should be, in these senses, 
rational and large. 
Again Story’s argument lies in his answer to the “whose meaning” 
question, and in the political theories that together support it—the 
command and popular-sovereignty theories. Because the goal of 
constitutional interpretation is to get at the probable intentions of the 
populace that authorized the document, the constitutional text must be 
interpreted as a whole according to its apparent purpose. “The words are 
not, indeed, to be stretched beyond their fair sense; but within that range, 
the rule of interpretation must be taken, which best follows out the apparent 
intention.”104 In contemporary parlance, although semantic meaning no 
                                                
102 Story (1st edition) at 385. See 2 T. Rutherforth, Institutes of Natural Law; 
Being the Substance of a Course of Lectures on Grotius de Jure Belli et 
Pacis, Read in St. John's College, Cambridge 407-08 (1832). (“Where we 
collect the intention of the speaker or the writer from his words only, as 
they lie before us, this is literal interpretation. Where his words do not 
express his intention perfectly, but either exceed it or fall short of it, so that 
we are to collect it from probable or rational conjectures only, this is 
rational interpretation.”). 
103 Story (1st edition) at 386. 
104 Story (1st edition) at 397. See also id. at 406 (“But a constitution of 
government, founded by the people for themselves and their posterity, and 
for objects of the most momentous nature, for perpetual union, for the 
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doubt matters, the ultimate goal is to get at a constitution’s pragmatic 
meaning. 
Unlike Story, Cooley does not employ the distinctions between 
literal and rational, or large and narrow, interpretation. But he draws the 
connection between popular authorization and the intent behind the 
constitutional text even more closely.  
 
Every such instrument is adopted as a whole, and a clause which, 
standing by itself, might seem of doubtful import, may yet be made 
plain by comparison with other clauses or portions of the same law. 
It is therefore a rule of construction, that the whole is to be 
examined with a view to arriving at the true intention of each part.105 
 
The ultimate goal of constitutional interpretation is not the document’s 
literal meaning, but its intended one. When the text’s semantic and 
pragmatic meanings conflict, literal meaning give’s way to the apparent 
intended meaning of its words. 
The final question I identified under the “what type of meaning” 
heading concerns what facts go into the determination of a text or other 
speech act’s meaning. Story and Cooley’s emphasis on purpose does not 
preclude a shared adherence to textualism. Both give primacy to the 
constitutional text. Although the goal is to get at the sovereign people’s 
intent, as Cooley puts it, “this intent is to be found in the instrument itself. It 
is to be presumed that language has been employed with sufficient 
precision to convey it, and unless examination demonstrates that the 
presumption does not hold good in the particular case, nothing will remain 
except to enforce it.”106 Textualism of this sort was common in nineteenth 
century jurisprudence. But Story expressly ties his constitutional textualism 
to the theory of popular sovereignty. The Constitution’s plain meaning 
governs because “[n]othing but the text itself was adopted by the 
people.”107 
                                                                                                                     
establishment of justice, for the general welfare, and for a perpetuation of 
the blessings of liberty, necessarily requires, that every interpretation of its 
powers should have a constant reference to these objects.”) 
105 Cooley (1st edition) at 57. 
106 Cooley (1st edition) at 55. 
107 Story (1st edition) at 389. See also id. at 392 n.1 (“The people adopted 
the constitution according to the words of the text in their reasonable 
interpretation, and not according to the private interpretation of any 
particular men.”). Compare 2 Williston (1st edition) § 606, 1165 (“Where 
[the parties] incorporate their agreement into a writing they have attempted 
more than to assent by means of symbols to certain things, they have 
assented to the writing as the adequate expression of the things to which 
they agree.”). 
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Story’s and Cooley’s answers to the “what facts” question, however, 
is not the legal analog of sola scriptura. I have suggested that the existence 
of multiple meanings entails that when one form of interpretation runs out, 
another might step in. Story and Cooley’s answer to the “what facts” 
question illustrates just that. When the constitutional text alone does not 
answer a legal question, the interpreter should look to extrinsic evidence of 
its meaning. Thus Cooley writes, “It is possible . . . that after we shall have 
made use of all the lights which the instrument itself affords, there may still 
be doubts to clear up and ambiguities to explain. Then, and only then, are 
we warranted in seeking elsewhere for aid.”108 Similarly, Story argues that 
“contemporary construction” of the text may be used “to illustrate, and 
confirm the text, to explain a doubtful phrase, or to expound an obscure 
clause.”109 In short, when the constitutional text’s plain meaning does not 
resolve a legal question, interpretation may take into account evidence 
from beyond the text. When one form of interpretation runs out, another 
can step in. 
The above discussion does not cover everything that Cooley and 
Story have to say about constitutional interpretation. Nor does everything 
they say tie back to my analysis of interpretation and construction. But 
many of the core arguments do. Both Story and Cooley ground large 
portions of their theories of constitutional interpretation not on a theory of 
meaning, but on a political theory of constitutions: a command theory of 
law together with a commitment to popular sovereignty. They use that 
political theory to develop a theory of constitutional construction that 
identifies as legally relevant the text’s public meaning, as distinguished from 
the framers’ authorial understanding or the meaning ratifiers might have 
attached to the text; that prioritizes nontechnical over technical meanings; 
that looks to pragmatic rather than semantic meaning; that gives priority to 
textual interpretation; and that allows for extrinsic evidence of meaning 
when textual interpretation runs out. These arguments nicely illustrate the 
complementary conception of interpretation and construction, the 
multiplicity of meanings, the conceptual priority of construction, and the 
fact that when one form of interpretation runs out, another can step in.  
4 The Fixation Thesis 
Before ending, I want to consider one more passage from Cooley’s 
Treatise that further confirms the value of the above account of 
interpretation and construction. Early in his chapter on constitutional 
interpretation, Cooley advances a claim strikingly similar what Solum calls 
“the fixation thesis.” Solum puts that thesis as follows: “The object of 
constitutional interpretation is the communicative content of the 
                                                
108 Cooley (1st edition) at 65. 
109 Story (1st edition) at 390. 
 
 
 
Contracts and Constitutions  
 
 36 
constitutional text, and that content was fixed when each provision was 
framed and/or ratified.”110 Along the same lines, Cooley writes: “The 
meaning of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not 
different at any subsequent time when a court has occasion to pass upon 
it.”111 
Taken out of context, one might read Cooley’s version in either of 
two ways. On the first, it belongs to the theory of language. The meaning of 
a speech act is a fact about it that does not change over time. On the 
second, it belongs to political theory. The purpose of a constitution is better 
served by attributing it a meaning that does not change over time. 
Solum’s case for his fixation thesis suggests that he understands it in 
the first sense. Solum argues that the communicative content of a speech 
act depends on two facts: the conventional semantic meaning of the words 
in it and relevant aspects of the context that enrich its semantic content.112 
Both are facts about the world at the time the speech act is produced. 
Because the facts that go into determining a speech act’s communicative 
content are “time-bound,” so too is that meaning. Solum’s fixation thesis is 
therefore a claim not about law, but about communicative content. “The 
core of the affirmative case for the Fixation Thesis is rooted in common 
sense intuitions about the meaning of old texts.”113 
Although Solum’s conception of communicative content is 
relatively catholic, in the sense that it can accommodate different versions 
of originalism,114 it describes only one category of meanings the 
constitutional text might have. Solum considers whether pluralism about 
meanings provides an objection to the fixation thesis.115 He takes Mark 
Greenberg’s work as an example, and argues that the three types of 
meaning Greenberg identifies—framer meaning, ratifier meaning and literal 
clause meaning—“all . . . are fixed, albeit at slightly different times.”116 But 
of course those are only the three types of meaning Greenberg happens to 
identify. With respect to the idea that there might be “other unfixed 
meanings” of the constitutional text, such as “the meaning that is 
normatively reasonable given contemporary circumstances and values,” 
Solum offers two answers. First, he observes that reasonable contemporary 
                                                
110 Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Facts in 
Original Meaning, 91 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 15 (2015). 
111 Cooley (1st edition) at 55. 
112 Solum, supra note 110 at 23-25.  
113 Id. at 29. 
114 See id. at 15 (“The use of the phrase ‘communicative content’ is 
intended to be neutral as between various theories of content, e.g., original 
public meaning versus original intentions (and other theories).”) 
115 Id. at 67-70 (discussing Mark Greenberg, The Moral Impact Theory of 
Law, 123 Yale L.J. 1288 (2014)). 
116 Id. at 69. 
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meaning “is not a plausible meaning of the authoritative token of the 
constitutional text.”117 I take this to be a restatement of Solum’s commitment 
to originalism, which is just a commitment to the thesis that the words in 
the constitution should be given the meaning they “had in the original 
expression token.”118 As Solum himself recognizes, this is not the only 
possible approach to the constitutional text. The Supreme Court often treats 
its words as types, finding their meaning in post-ratification acts of judicial 
interpretation and contemporary .119 The meaning of the Constitution as 
token is not the only meaning of the text. Solum’s second answer is that 
“[t]he communicative content of the original Constitution, written in 1787, 
cannot be plausibly viewed as identical to the content that would be 
reasonable to day.”120 This answer assumes that the goal of constitutional 
interpretation should be to identify the text’s communicative content. Like 
the token argument, it too assumes we already know Which of meaning is 
legally relevant. But the multiple-meanings objection is that we need an 
argument for claims about what type of meaning matters. Solum’s fixation 
thesis is a claim about one type of meaning, not an argument that that type 
should govern. 
In distinction to Solum’s linguistic argument for the fixation thesis, 
Cooley’s argument is a functional one. It turns not on the nature of 
language but on what we want a written constitution to do. 
 
A constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and 
another at some subsequent time when the circumstances may have 
so changed as perhaps to make a different rule in the case seem 
desirable. A principal share of the benefit expected from written 
constitutions would be lost if the rules they established were so 
flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by public 
opinion. It is with special reference to the varying moods of public 
opinion, and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government 
beyond their control, that these instruments are framed; and there 
can be no such steady and imperceptible change in their rules as 
inheres in the principles of the common law.121 
 
Cooley’s version of the fixation thesis is based not on “common sense 
intuitions about the meaning of old texts,” but on what constitutional 
interpretation must look like if the polity is to secure the benefits of a 
written constitution. His is an argument not about language, but about the 
law: it is desirable that the meaning of a written constitution not change 
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over time. Although this is a claim about what constitutional interpretation 
should look like, it is at bottom about the best rule of constitutional 
construction. It addresses not what a constitution means, but which of its 
meanings should matter when determining its legal effect. 
The point of the above is not to argue that one or another version of 
the fixation thesis is better, but to illustrate the value of distinguishing 
between interpretation and construction along the lines I have suggested. 
Each version of the fixation thesis is incomplete in its own way. Solum’s 
linguistic argument, if successful, shows only that if the Constitution’s 
original communicative content is its legally relevant meaning, then that 
meaning is fixed. The argument does not demonstrate the truth of the 
antecedent—that the Constitution’s original communicative content should 
be the legally relevant meaning. In Solum’s theoretical framework, that is 
the job of a separate Constraint Principle.122 Cooley’s argument, if 
successful, identifies a desideratum for any legally relevant meaning: that it 
be fixed. It too does not in itself tell us which meaning is relevant, as more 
than one might be fixed at the time of ratification. Unlike Solum’s 
argument, however, Cooley’s operates at the level on which questions of 
constitutional interpretive theory must ultimately be answered. This is the 
level of rules of construction, which in the law are conceptually prior to 
rules of interpretation. 
                                                
122 Solum, supra note 110 at 64 (suggesting that arguments for using the 
contemporary meanings of the words in the Constitution “target[] the 
Constraint Principle and not the Fixation Thesis”). 
